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The fact of religious diversity is vital for the philosopher of religion but also, to some extent,
for the believer of a given faith. It takes place in such a dimension in which the views of
a given believer or the meaning of the practice of a given religion presupposes the truthful-
ness of specific claims concerning a given religion or the beliefs included in it. If now on
the part of the philosopher of religion or the followers of another religion, there is a direct or
indirect challenge to such a key proposition, religious disagreement with epistemic dimen-
sion is involved. At the same time, it is not the case that any religious diversity is a case of
epistemically significant religious dissent. The paper, by distinguishing different aspects of
religions and functions performed by religion, tries to show in which situations religious di-
versification leads to religious disagreement. Both the follower of religion and the philoso-
pher of religion can and should seek the truth in matters of crucial importance to religion.
The difference is that the follower of a given religion is more interested in the salvific and
practical functions of religion, along with the associated sense of value and meaningfulness
of life and, to a lesser degree, the theoretical certainty that her religion is correct at crucial
points. On the other hand, the achievement of ‘the soteriological’ purpose of religion based
on false belief is impossible, just as the meaningfulness of life 'based on the sand and not on
the rock’. It is because the false foundation is devoid of higher value. That is why there is
a community of a philosopher of religion and a follower of a given religion to search for
the truth of it.
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The fact of religious diversity and related religious disagreement can be the subject of
a thoughtful reflection made from the perspective of a believer of religion and moti-
vated  by  the  interests  that  have  its  source  in  the  religion  of  a  given  person.
On the other hand, they may be the object of a study of religion which is not reli-
giously committed, including the philosophy of religion1. However, it cannot be over-
looked that philosophers of religion can be guided non-exclusively by theoretical mo-
tivation, but they also take part in various types of social and political activities, such
as those aimed at increasing tolerance and peaceful coexistence among the followers
of different religions  [Meister, 2009, p. 24, 41‒42]. Those theoretical and practical
projects, directed by different goals, should not be confused. One of the crucial issues
raised in this article is the question whether a devotee of a particular religion can and
maybe even should consider the point of view of the philosopher of religion in her re-
flection on the significance of religious diversity for her religious attitude. The answer
to this question requires grasping the similarities and differences between the two per-
spectives – that of a believer and that of a philosopher.
Usually,  philosophers  of  religion investigating the problem of  religious dis-
agreement direct their attention to religious beliefs and their epistemic properties,
including their epistemic justification or warrant and take up the issue of weight, di-
versity of the kinds of evidence [Dormandy, 2008, p. 56‒83] supporting them and
an  obligation  of  regulating  of  beliefs  by  epistemic  norms governing  evidence2.
Therefore,  it  is  reasonable considering this fact  to pose a fundamental  question,
which is the second problem of this text, namely: which types of religious diversity
and dissent have a direct or indirect epistemic dimension?
In order to assess the importance of religious diversity and religious disagree-
ment, one must grasp the fact of the internal complexity, as well as internal plura-
lism of particular religions, so as not to seek discord where there is a misunder-
standing  arising  from the  confusion  of  different  practices  [Waardenburg,  1986].
To this end, it is necessary to distinguish different structural elements of religion to-
gether with the authentic purpose of a given religion and to grasp the significance of
possible variation of these elements for factual religious diversity or only apparent
or irrelevant  religious discord.  It  is  also crucial  to understand the connection of
the separate elements with the distinction between the practical dimensions of reli-
gion and between its cognitive dimension. Diversity of religion can concern both
aspects, but the one that is usually emphasized by philosophers is the cognitive di-
mension. The next task of this text is to identify areas and types of real discord re-
lated to religious diversity.
Finally, the paper outlines the criteria that the philosopher of religion should
take in assessing religion and will  answer the question concerning the extent to
which a believer may or even should use the method and results of philosophizing
in his reflection on his religious involvement. Agreeing with the partial difference
1 At least three types of religious sciences can be distinguished, namely, religious studies, theologi-
cal sciences of religion as apologetics and confessional theology of religion and philosophical sci-
ences of religion. For a defence of such a view, see: [Bronk, 2003, p. 75‒89].
2 Examples of such an approach can be found in: [Gellman, 1993, p., 345‒364; King, 2008, p.,
830‒853].
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in the  attitude of  the  follower  and philosopher  of  religion,  the  paper  argues  for
the claim  that  a  religious  follower  may  use  the  same  rule  of  judging  religion
in the light of the philosopher's argument, provided that he shares with the philoso-
pher the love of truth and knowledge. However, the paper points to the differences
in solving the problem of religious disagreement between a believer and a philoso-
pher, which arises, among other things, from the difference of the importance applied
to the cognitive dimension of religion and the significance given to the sources of reli-
gious cognition. All things considered, religious diversity and related religious disagree-
ment are in many respects important for epistemic dimensions of religious belief, but
the answer to them will be slightly different for a philosopher and a believer. Neverthe-
less, even though the philosophical approach external to the religion is different from
the specific religious thinking, a religious believer should consider essential outcomes
of philosophical thinking as well as findings of religious studies in general.
What does philosophy do and what is the philosophy of religion?
The following thoughts strive to outline the elements of philosophy that have
consequences for the search for a specifically philosophical solution to the situation
of disagreement, including disagreement over matters of religion. Some philosophy
of religion is an application of some method of philosophy to questions concerning
different religions. Therefore, to understand the philosophy of religion we need to
understand the method of philosophy first.
What is philosophy?
Philosophy understood as a human activity with its  results  is  not  one ‘sub-
stance’ or even one thing. There is no such thing as the nature of philosophy in ge-
neral. There are different methods or ways of philosophizing. It is correct to say that
there  is  more  than  one  kind  of  philosophical  activity,  corresponding  to  some
metaphilosophy, or orderly selection of a formal object, purpose, tasks, and means
to achieve them. Individual philosophers are advocates of one of the many practices
and concepts of philosophizing that can be combined into some larger groups due to
minor differences. Among others, there is also a kind of careful philosophical prac-
tice, understood as metaphysical, epistemological and ethical research, directed to-
wards the nature of objective reality – for example being, knowledge or right moral
action. This type of philosophy was practiced in the Antiquity, the Middle Ages and
modernity. It is also popular in many currents of modern philosophy and is not li -
mited to a specific school  of philosophizing,  but  finds its  followers in many of
them, like Platonism, Aristotelianism, Thomism, some parts of the phenomenologi-
cal movement and analytical philosophy. Below, a partial description of the philoso-
phy understood in such a way, and its consequences for the problem of religious
disagreement will be presented.
The purpose of this kind of philosophizing is theoretical and practical knowledge
and  truth.  Moreover,  the  practice  of  such  philosophizing  and  its  results  should
meet a number of certain characteristics. Among them are anti-dogmatism, criticism,
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intersubjectivity of philosophizing and its effects, proper justification of philosophical
beliefs, application of the analysis method, rigorous language, and reasoning. The fun-
damental value in the theoretical aspect of such practice is a truth, and the main aim is
philosophical knowledge of some part of reality [Pepliński, 2018, p. 41‒48].
Some central philosophical attitudes
and rules of thus understood philosophy
A1 The pursuit of knowledge (and thus the truth – because propositional know-
ledge entails the truth of a given proposition) is one of the two main goals of philo-
sophy. The second goal of philosophizing is a practical goal, which is happiness un-
derstood as a good life. Philosophy is not only about getting to know what such
a good life is  about,  which requires knowing the place of man in the Universe.
In addition to providing knowledge of the means to achieve the discovered purpose
of human existence, the philosophical way of life is an integral part of achieving
this goal [Hadot, 1995]. We accept as a theoretical principle, the propositions that
T0. We are not born with knowledge about the most critical existential issues, nor
with wisdom whose truths would coincide with the worldviews of religions. Get-
ting to know these matters is most often like opinions gained through participation
in societies (and cultures) sharing knowledge/cognition, including religious com-
munities – like family and other kinds.
T1. Each of us is fallible3.
From this, it follows that both a philosopher herself and other philosophers or
just other people who have a different opinion regarding the solution of a specific
philosophical problem may be wrong. Therefore, as the next principle, we accept
that in the light of the possibility of error,
A2 We should strive, as far as we can, to critically investigate the value of our pos-
ition as well as opposing or contradictory views.
A3 The realization of  A2 is  carried out through the application of  the analysis
method, the use of precise language and logically valid reasoning.
As well as
A4 We should take an attitude of open-mindedness and impartiality – we should
accept the results of such a critical study regardless of whether they are in line
with our expectations, the preferred vision of the world or not and always consider
the real epistemic status of elements of a set of competitive solutions.
A4a If we find a deductive argument, we should accept the truth of the position
in question.
A4b If the results of the investigation do not resolve unequivocally which one of
the competing positions is correct, we should accept the partial confirmation of the
competitive beliefs and the justification they have.
3 A fallibilist approach to religious disagreement is presented, for example, in: [Kraft, 2012].
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A5 Both issues resolved and especially those that remain unsettled should become
the subject of further critical inquiries, in which the confrontation of the results
obtained by a given philosopher with the assessment made by other philosophers
and the results obtained by them plays a significant role.
What is common for the quoted principles is the theoretical position that
T2 The philosopher's acknowledgement of the value of truth or falseness of a given
metaphysical, ethical or epistemological position is determined by the arguments
and evidence that testify to its truthfulness or its falsehood.
In other words, the primary tool for changing a philosophical position is sound
and valid reasoning. If a philosopher uses any kind of experience, then it performs
evidential  functions  through  specific  mediating  reasoning  from  evidence  to
a knowledge of something. However, the use of T2 is difficult because philosophy
does not consider only the number or strength of arguments and evidence, but also
the importance that the philosopher assigns to them in the light of her current, rela-
tivized to a given time, understanding of reality.
T3 results from T2:
T3. The sociological or academic authority of the opponent, her actual rationality
or being epistemically equal is not enough to accept her position, because none of
them remain in the proper relation to the truth of her stance.
It is the case because even a reliable person may be subject to prejudice and
make mistakes in reasoning. Concerning knowledge having an intersubjective char-
acter, we are all equal.
The philosophy of religion
and the possible solution to the problem of religious disagreement
The philosophy of religion is  the application of some general  philosophical
principles to the complex phenomenon of various religions. It seeks to gain know-
ledge and understanding of different aspects of religious phenomena. What is dis-
agreement within such practice of philosophy of examining a specific religious doc-
trine or religious belief? It consists in stopping the discussion at a given moment of
the study because at this time, the two sides of the discussion do not have convin-
cing arguments for the truth of their approach. Both sides know their argument; they
know the weaknesses and strengths of their position. Neither of them is convincing
for all, however, and each of the alternative shots carries some costs.
For example, we may point at the disagreement over the properly basic status
of belief in God and ask if we should construe the problem in terms of internalism
and justification or externalism and warrant. At the beginning of this century, nei-
ther reformed epistemology nor evidentialist epistemology has resolved the matter
indisputably. So, the question needs further argumentation, and some philosophers
try to develop it4.
4 See: [Plantinga, 1991] for essential examples of Reformed Epistemology. [Swinburne, 1984] is
an example of the evidentialist approach.
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Recently, in the last dozen or so years, the issue of the rationality of religious
beliefs has often been undertaken in the aspect of religious diversity and the prob-
lem of religious disagreement. However, the problem of disagreement is put diffe-
rently. The discussion is concerned with:
the epistemic challenge raised by religious disagreement: does awareness of the na-
ture and extent of religious disagreement make it unreasonable to hold confident re-
ligious […] views? [Pittard, 2018].
The discussions in the epistemology of religion are the application of the re-
sults of similar discussions in general epistemology. Among the recently undertaken
epistemological  issues,  issues  concerning  the  situation  of  disagreement  between
equal philosophers or researchers play a significant role. One should not underesti-
mate the significance of the various solutions proposed during the numerous and so-
phisticated discussions held by epistemologists regarding the importance of discord
as a possible testimony that can influence our beliefs5. However, the position pre-
sented here prefers the search for solutions to disagreement on the way of inquiries
of a subject, stressing the importance of a “material”, not “formal” approach, so to
speak, to the extent that is available to us in the area of religion. Presenting this po-
sition, we could use Jennifer Lackey’s terminology and classification of the possible
ways of solving the situation of epistemic contention. As she puts it, there are two
basic attitudes towards the fact of disagreement:
The nonconformists, who maintain that one can continue to rationally believe that
p  despite  the  fact  that  one’s  epistemic  peer  explicitly  believes  that  not-p”.
The second  view  is  that  “of  the conformists,  who  hold  that,  unless  one  has
a reason that is independent of the disagreement itself to prefer one’s own belief,
one cannot continue to rationally believe that p when one is faced with an epi-
stemic peer who explicitly believes that not-p” [Lackey, 2014, p. 300‒301].
Like nonconformists, we argue that there can be reasonable disagreement among
epistemic  peers  in  philosophy  as  well  as  in  religious  context.  It  is  because  of
the mainly non-deductive characteristic of justification of philosophical views. There
are many different philosophical interpretations of some aspects of reality, with a par-
tial justification of their correctness. The same is correct with a religious interpreta-
tion of reality and of Man’s place within it. Religious beliefs, or even more so reli-
gious faith, do not fulfill only or mainly a descriptive function to the world, especially
when this function of religious utterances or religious beliefs is attempted to be under-
stood in the way statements, opinions or scientific knowledge are, including philo-
sophical ones. However, when the problem consists in explaining why a devotee ac-
cepts certain beliefs, doctrines or religious judgments, answering this question and
defending its legitimacy almost always refers to the descriptive function and cognitive
meaning of religious beliefs and their truth claims [Kraft, p. 97‒108].
Like the correct  reasoning view states,  we believe that  someone is  justified
in giving  her  belief  extra  weight  in  the  face  of  peer  disagreement  if  the  belief
in question is, in fact, the product of correct reasoning. An equally important factor
is the coherence of the result of reasoning with the knowledge and the experience of
5 See: [Pittard] for an elementary bibliography of epistemology of religious disagreement.
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a philosopher. However, we hold against them that it is false that the mere fact that
two persons disagree does not rationally require any doxastic revision on every part,
even if they cannot point to any significant epistemic asymmetry between them. So,
we agree with the conformists that the fact of disagreement between those who re-
gard one another as epistemic peers requires some action, though not necessarily al-
ways significant doxastic revision in the face of peer disagreement.
Instead of a ‘rational action’ of a weakening of belief, we propose a solution
consisting in maintaining one’s position combined with an intense search for a solu-
tion to the situation of disagreement through developing a new one and examining
the old argumentation. The conciliationism and lowering confidence in own’s belief
by both sides is not the correct answer. It is because the sole fact of disagreement
does not point to correct move of dispute. Moreover, it does not do so because we
still do not know which position is correct and which is false.
In the  case  of  disputes  in  the  field of  religion,  this  depends,  among other
things, on capturing and understanding the current epistemic and non-epistemic,
factual basis for the acceptance of a given perspective, view, and doctrine. Be-
sides, it should include both possible support for the position adopted by the rest
of the available religious knowledge belonging to a given religious tradition, as
well as philosophical and scientific knowledge, if the latter can take place. An-
other element is the attempt to deepen understanding of a given practice or reli -
gious response as a particular case of a more general trans-religious or inter-reli -
gious problem. Of course, the key here is to consider the possibility that we are
not dealing with one problem but, in fact, with various problems and different so-
lutions to different problems. An example of such a question may be the so-called
problem of salvation in the world religions and various ways to solve the problem
of evil.  It  is  not  evident  that  these problems are understood in the same sense
in various religions, for example, in Buddhism and Christianity, though both reli-
gions address the issue of suffering.
Ultimately speaking, there are many disputes between religions interpreted as
a whole, sophisticated type of religious life, as a set of practices subordinated to
the realization of a religious goal or a collection of goals. What is needed in the case
of  religious  disagreement  is  intra-religious  and  trans-religious  hermeneutics  of
the meaning of certain doctrines, practices and the whole religion in the light of
a broadly understood in-depth reflection on religions as a means of achieving a par-
ticular life goal or their set.
Does this stance recognize someone’s point of view as epistemologically privi-
leged? It is not the case, because it does not assume dogmatically that any particular
point of view is “the” correct one. We do accept the possibility of rejection of our
position, and our belief in the light of the results of further investigation. In the falli-
bilist spirit, the position that “we are right” in a case is possible to reconcile with
the recognition that we can be wrong. The more important the issues are, the more
importance we should attribute to their critical consideration in the situation of dis-
agreement. Such a position does not entail either a lack of religious conviction or
the need for believers to doubt their beliefs. Neither agnostic nor skeptic solutions
are necessary as a reaction to the complexity of issues, the multitude of positions,
the fact of discord, and the possibility of an error made by each of us. Instead of
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this, our posit requires striving for a better understanding of one’s religious tradi-
tion, its practical and theoretical meaning, and its epistemic justification, and the re-
lations of these two dimensions – theoretical and practical – to each other. It re -
quires more,  namely a better  understanding of the meanings of the existence of
different religious traditions as different and sometimes competitive ways of ulti-
mately governing human existence.
Does diversity among religions always carry a religious disagreement
that is an epistemic challenge?
We are aware of religious diversity. Religious diversification occurs not only
among religions but also within a given religion. Let us take into consideration dif-
ferent ways of living conducted by laypeople and monks of different religions, or
for example different rules governing the behaviour of the latter, different confes-
sion in Christianity or different school of Buddhism. However, do all  matters of
a religious dispute and diversification have an epistemological dimension? It seems
not to be the case. It should, therefore, be indicated in which aspects religious diver-
sity has and in which it does not have a significant epistemic dimension. To this
end, one should realize the complexity of the phenomenon of religion and its inter-
nal differentiation into practical and theoretical elements.
What is included in religion and what kinds of diversity can appear?
In order to realize the task of distinguishing the theoretical and practical ele-
ments  in a given religion,  we will  use the  characterization of  religion made by
William Alston. Alston, in his article “Religion” (2006), distinguishes several con-
stituent elements of religions, which will be divided into two groups; the first con-
tains items that can serve theoretical functions and can be evaluated regarding their
truthfulness or falsity, while the other consists of three parts, including practical ele-
ments [Alston, 2006, p. 366‒383].
One can, like Alston, distinguish three cognitive areas of the theoretical dimen-
sion of a given religion. Of course, not every religion contains an attitude of faith
and its correlative – objective faith. However, every religion as a practice is consti-
tuted by theoretical and practical beliefs, sometimes only implicitly assumed. Al-
ston points to three critical items. First is a. a belief in supernatural beings (gods).
The second is b. distinction between sacred and profane objects specific for the reli-
gion, and the third is c. a worldview, or a general picture of the world as a whole
and the place of the individual therein.
Claiming that religion has a theoretical dimension does not imply, for example,
that  religion should be treated as providing some quasi-scientific explanation of
the world. It is only about the elementary function of describing the world which
belongs to propositional structures. The most important aspects of the cognitive/the-
oretical dimension of religion are: like every element of human culture, human ac-
tivity that forms a religion is guided by cognition, connected with the language ex-
pressing,  objectifying,  consolidating  and  communicating  this  cognition;  every
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religion is created by a specific ‘creed’ or creed [Bocheński, 1965, p. 10]. So, for
each religion, one can strive to determine the d. conditions of meaningful involve-
ment in it. It means that it presents itself as a rational/reasonable activity, under cer-
tain conditions. These conditions do not have to (though they can) be acknowledged
directly in the creed, and believers do not have to be aware of them. Whether our
world meets these conditions is essential for the rationality of a given religion and
of the involvement of people in its practices.
On the other  hand,  the practical  elements of  religions include morality  and
a way of life, religious worship and prayers, as well as the social organization of be-
lievers into various groups and institutions. The first two elements are e. a moral
code believed to be sanctioned by the gods and f. a more or less total organization
of one’s life based on the worldview. The part related to prayer and worship in-
cludes g. ritual acts focused on sacred objects; h. characteristically religious feelings
which tend to be aroused in the presence of sacred objects and during the practice of
ritual, and which are connected in idea with the gods; i. prayer and other forms of
communication with gods. In the case of the social element, Alston only describes it
as j. a social group bound together by the above.
Alston’s nine-element definition of religion can be improved. Regarding the theo-
retical dimension, apart from d. the set mentioned above of proposition correlative
to the conditions of the meaningfulness of a given religious practice, one can distin-
guish  k.  experiences  that  characterize  a  given  religion  and religious  attitude  of
a given believer and l. a more or less developed theological or philosophical reflec-
tion over the content of religious beliefs. The moral element also includes m. the es-
sential practical attitudes for a given religion, such as the attitude of faith or the atti-
tude of daily mindfulness, an ascetic attitude or the one based on a heroic pursuit of
a morally good life, ethical discipline or exercises aimed at getting enlightenment.
As far as the social dimension is concerned, it is necessary to emphasize the internal
structure of religion, the division of social roles of believers, the relationship be-
tween the individual and the religious community as well as relations of a given re-
ligion or religious community with non-religious communities.
What is essential, Alston also points out that three different types of religiosity
can be distinguished due to a location of the divine and response to it and, corre-
spondingly, the importance attributed to the social dimension of moral practices, as-
cetics, worship, and religious experience. Accordingly, he distinguishes a prophetic
religion, a sacramental religion, and a mystical religion.
It may seem that thanks to the distinction of theoretical and practical elements
in religion,  it  is  relatively easy to explain the kinds of religious diversity result
in the  existence of  a  theoretical  religious disagreement.  Namely,  it  would occur
in a situation where the contradiction or differentiation of the religious beliefs and
religious interpretations of them and also in the case of a difference of opinion spec-
ifying the proper realization of practical-religious points of e-m would occur. Such
an explanation is, however, insufficient. It is because religions are complex sets of
practices  that  can  fulfill  more  than  one  function  in  the  life  of  their  followers.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that some functions or one of the func-
tions may have distinguished value and be referred to as the primary or only func-
tion of a given religion. The primary function in two different religions can be so
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different that it only seems like we are dealing with a dispute about how to reach
a supposedly common goal for two religions. In the meantime, we are dealing with
either misunderstanding or an implicit dispute that is worth pursuing. At the same
time, due to the complexity of religious practices, practical means used to achieve
different  goals,  such  as  meditation  techniques  or  ways  of  gaining  control  over
the emotional sphere, despite being differently understood elements of different re-
ligions, actually lead to the same goal of development or positive personal change.
In order to deepen the understanding of the nature of discord among religions,
it is necessary to pay attention to the primary and subordinate functions that a given
religion performs. What is missing in Alston's article is the importance of the differ-
ent role or function of religion for a believer. Religions, or more specifically, the re-
ligious life of a particular believer, are differentiated because of the function she
prefers  or  many functions  that  religion  performs in her  life.  Due  to  place  con-
straints, we will only outline the division of the functions of religion by means of
some examples, essential for our argument.
Functions of religion
F.1. Religious-specific functions.
Sometimes philosophers express themselves in a way that suggests that they
treat religions as practices aimed at the same goal or at least for the same type or
type of purpose. This goal is called salvific or soteriological. It is about realizing
such goals of human action, which, according to a given religion are available to
those who practice a given religion. Such a goal may be to be reaching the state of
buddha, Nirvana, getting to know God, the forgiveness of sins, living in a special
relationship with God. Chad Meister, for example, describes the goal of Hinduism
as “moksha, release from the cycle of death and rebirth (samsara), and absorption
into Brahman”, of Buddhism as “nirvana, liberation from the wheel of samsara and
extinction of all desires, cravings, and suffering”, of Judaism as “blessedness with
God – here and perhaps in the hereafter”, of Christianity as “spiritual transformation
and spending eternity with God in the kingdom of heaven”. For Islam “the soterio-
logical goal is blessedness in paradise through submission to the laws of Allah and
by His mercy”. Let us ignore the question that the above definitions of religious
purposes are short and simplify given religious traditions6. The use of the term “sal-
vation” has the character of mental abbreviation and simplification. It is not sug-
gested here that all  religions are soteriological,  and only one wants to underline
the explicitly religious character of this group of functions.
F.2. Non-specifically religious purposes of religion.
These goals can be achieved by practicing a different religion or through other
non-religious practices. We will mention only some of these goals:
6 “Consider the following views from several major world religions regarding a fundamental con-
cern of religion – the soteriological (salvation) goal as typically understood in the respective tradi -
tions […]” [Meister, p. 25].
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F.2.1. Providing the worldview ‘skeleton’.
Through the worldview, one understands the essential claims regarding what
exists, the types and hierarchies of goods worth pursuing, describing, interpreting
the world's place of the individual in the world, and regulating conduct.  Part of
the worldview is the answer to the questions about what the meaning of life is and
with what activity one can lead such a meaningful life.
F.2.1.1. Describing a meaningful life and being a part of it.
Different, incompatible religions can fulfill these functions. They can at least
partly be accomplished also by philosophical thinking and practice, as well as by
other types of activity. They can, at least in part, be carried out even with the falsity
of some claims of a given religion, as it may occur in the sense of the meaning of
life due to belonging to a particular community of people sharing specific values,
goals or by finding their place in a particular social hierarchy.
F.2.1.2 Providing and helping in the practice of a set of moral principles that
guide the life of a given individual.
F.2.2 Organizing the “psyche” of a given person, his emotional-volitional, men-
tal and spiritual life and satisfying his needs and inclinations to know the truth,
reach the good and enjoy the beauty and in particular, achieving internal peace and
the right attitude towards other living beings, especially other people.
F.2.3 Various other functions related to socialization or satisfying the needs of
a given person; the functions identified by the sociology of religion.
About  the  function consisting in  describing the world,  we should note  that
a particular (religious) worldview has two connected but different goals – first it de-
scribes and explains the world and gives us some rules governing our lives. This is
the function with epistemic dimension: such a worldview is true and correct or not.
The second goal of a worldview is to be a foundation of rational (in the light of
a particular worldview) everyday activity and making crucial decisions. The second
goal may be achieved even if the worldview is false in some of its parts.
Now we can return to our questions: namely, which types of religious diversity
and dissent  have a  direct  or  indirect  epistemic dimension and whether  diversity
among religions always carries religious disagreement that  is  an epistemic chal-
lenge. So far, we have found that a theoretical religious disagreement would occur
in a situation where the contradiction or differentiation of the religious beliefs and
religious interpretations of them would occur. It would also occur in the case of
a difference of opinion specifying the proper realization of practical-religious points
of e-m.
Now it can be seen that the primary and fundamental issue and the place of
possible disagreement is the nature of the goal of religion worth pursuing. Stating
this more strongly, the realization of which is the duty of people, for example, due
to the right attitude towards God/Ultimate Reality or appropriate, most accurate or
adequate orientation in reality. It is therefore, about choosing the right aim from the
F1 set.
The achieving of the proper purpose is usually defined as available only by
means determined by a  religious system of  concepts  and beliefs,  which specify
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the right moral, spiritual and social practice of the devotee, corresponding to points
F.2.1.2, F.2.2 and F.2.3. It may also be that some ethical practices are not treated as
a means to achieve the soteriological purpose of religion, but these are matters re-
lated to each other in a different but necessary way.
However, the theoretical dispute regarding the manner of achieving the goal
from the collection of F.1 through properly conducted life is not so much a problem
of disagreement between the religions but merely a problem of the religious organi-
zation of human life. Therefore, in this context, the opposition between the dispute
within the religious tradition and the dispute between religious traditions seems to
lose some of its clarity. For this reason, there is a chance that the alleged and actual
diversification of religion turns out to contain elements belonging to F.2.1‒2.3 that
either exist in different religions or are not mutually exclusive. The chances for this
are higher if we treat these elements of religious life as valuable elements, irrespec-
tive of their relationship with the explicitly religious purpose of religious practice.
On the other hand, it is in the areas of moral, spiritual, and social life that are inter -
related that theoretical and practical disputes may arise. An example of this may be
the discord between Hinduism and Christianity regarding the function and signifi-
cance of suffering in the life of the individual and the right attitude towards the suf-
fering, arising due to the different eschatological understanding of suffering.
Of course, within one religion, there may be different ways of religious life or
different ways of achieving the goal of the final religion or goals specific to a given
way of life.  Analogously,  the diversity between religious practices or aspects of
these practices that are aimed at different goals does not necessarily result  from
the essence  of  theoretical  dissent  and  conflict.  Conflict  or  dispute  may  arise  if
the realization of one practice excludes the realization of the other, e.g., when the
aims of different religions are contradictory, or the realization of one is an obstacle
in the realization of the other. Another type of disagreement arises when the reli-
gious practice engages the believer’s life enough that there is no room for another
purpose. We would have a conflict when the soteriological goals of religion are mu-
tually exclusive. On the other hand, there would be no conflict if the intermediate
goals do not differ, or are achieved through different paths, and when the ultimate
goals of religion are not mutually exclusive.
It should also be remembered that the pursuing of different aims of different re-
ligions may require maximum commitment, including the demanding endowment
of the whole life,  both symbolically and literally. In addition, as is for example
in the case of Christianity, participation in practices or techniques of other religious
traditions can be understood as inconsistent  with unconditional  devotion to God
in the attitudes of faith, love and hope and with the appreciation of Jesus as a suffi-
cient and the perfect source of religious knowledge and The Way.
So, it is not always possible to dismiss the problem of religious diversity in
the way described earlier, because sometimes it can take the form of serious dis-
agreement. This may happen in many cases; we will omit here the situations related
to the cohabitation of different religious groups in one society, focusing on the theo-
retical disagreement. The severe type of religious diversification is the theoretical
and practical disagreement about what is worth or should be done or about objects
of religious worship. Religions, although they may agree that an essential part of
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life  is  worshiping  the  Sacrum,  can  vary  significantly  regarding  the  location  of
Sacrum. An example of this kind of disagreement is the disagreement among reli-
gions about which God/gods need to be worshiped. This kind of discord is a particular
case of theoretical/worldview disagreement about what exists, and about the duties
that govern human life, and about Man’s place in the universe. It must, therefore, be
recognized that there are cases of epistemic severe religious disagreement.
Therefore, the epistemological dimension of religious disagreement takes place
in the case of religious faith, which, although not reduced to its propositional as-
pect, nevertheless has a propositional dimension. Also, in the case of religions that
do not use the concept of revelation and authentic, orthodox, correct faith, we are
dealing with religious convictions that are treated realistically as having the logical
value of the truth. Even if they are not treated as revealed by God, they are treated
as correctly describing the reality of the world and man in the world and success -
fully regulating his actions due to his chosen goals, worth pursuing in life and be-
cause of being recognized as a binding ‘real’ relationship that connects goals with
the means to achieve them. We do not propose to treat religion as a theoretical prac-
tice like philosophy or science. However, even when religion plays its role of deliv-
ery of a worldview and making life meaningful, some parts of it have an epistemic
dimension which could be an object of disagreement and which could be examined
in an aspect of its epistemic status.
Even if we do not deal directly with the theoretical disagreement on the propo-
sitional level of religion, we can deal with it indirectly. An example is the striving
for a friendship of a believer with the Trinity and striving to get rid of ignoring
the non-existence of a permanent good in the world. So, there are conflicts where
there is a direct or indirect contradiction between the religious/philosophical beliefs
that are merely part of the creed of a given religion or where there is a contradiction
implicit between the assumed statements, whose truth is a condition of the meaning-
fulness of a given religious practice.
It seems that even if most of the religious differences are not epistemic dis-
agreements  between equals  or  if  we  do not  know that  such  a  conflict  between
the actual equals occurs, the very fact of contradictions in the critical issues should
encourage us, who recognize a reasonable belief, to make an effort to determine
which party is right. It may be that a person who does not agree with us is wrong,
but  it  may also be that  we are wrong.  Thus,  now we can address the question:
in the area of religious disagreement, can the follower of a particular religion use
methods and share attitudes characteristic of a philosopher?
What is the difference and what is the similarity of the attitude
of the philosopher of religion and the believer of a particular religion?
What,  then,  can  be  the  similarity  between  a  philosopher  and  a  follower?
The philosopher is guided by the pursuit of knowledge, stemming from the love of
the truth about reality. A similar love of truth can be found among some believers of
religion. This is especially true of those who have a distance to their understanding
of reality,  or  who creates a religiously inspired philosophy about  the object  of
worship or the place of man in reality. However, also when it is not the case that
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religion openly puts truth high in the hierarchy of values, if the believer values ob-
jectivity of her religion, then she should, like a philosopher, strive to achieve cogni-
tion, which will provide an answer to the question of whether her beliefs are true or
false. This is true, especially when she does not want her worldview, life efforts,
the way of dealing with evil and misfortune to be based on falsehood.
The difference between a philosopher and a follower is complicated. We will
take into account only such a situation that the philosopher cultivates philosophy as
a non-believer, and due to the extent of the analysis required to, omit a more com-
plicated situation, where the philosopher is also a believer of a particular religion.
Let us turn our attention to two aspects. The philosopher, in a way, professionally
strives  for  knowledge  and  tries  to  maximize  knowledge  and  understanding  of
a given point of reality, in this case, religious diversity. Philosophy demands an im-
partial and meta-objective position, examining the meaning of given religious be-
liefs, their internal and external coherence with other religious assertions and nonre-
ligious knowledge as well as the possibility of their connection with scientific and
philosophical knowledge, e.g., their justification or rational falsification, or partial
verification. That she does not achieve security of belief,  certainty and non-con-
clusive resolution in a given case, at a given time, is not a problem for her. She re-
turns to the survey regularly hoping to achieve an appropriate, certain knowledge
in an undefined time, and perhaps – never.
In turn, a follower of a given religion does not face such a comfortable situa -
tion, because, in a way, she has staked her life on a given religion. Thus, the case
in which she bet  on the wrong horse is difficult  for  her to accept.  She cannot,
however, suspend her belief without resolving it until at the end of an undeter -
mined future when she can settle the dispute once and for all. If therefore, the par-
ties involved in the debate do not obtain a decisive deductive argument, she has
the right to her belief for as long as in her view the validation of her disputed po-
sition is equally strong or stronger than the opposite. The mere fact that there are
cases of people who disagree with her in this matter and seeming to be equal to or
even more spiritually perfect in connection with the fact that she does not have
a conclusive argument is evidence functioning as a defeater of a possible certainty
of her view. Therefore, if she wants to combine a rational attitude of respect to-
wards the truth with the confidence of belief, she should, like a philosopher, un-
dertake critical inquiries aimed at examining the values of both positions, as far as
it is possible for her.
Consequently, she should conduct activities that are guided by A4–A5 attitudes.
Maintaining a legitimate belief, in the light of the lack of a stronger justification of
the opposite position combined with the search for the final resolution, is a rational
cognitive attitude in a situation of religious disagreement. Deepening the under-
standing of the real disagreement through the analysis of religious beliefs doctrines,
the hermeneutics of the meaning of a particular religious practice and the justifica-
tion of her beliefs through arguments does not exhaust the criteria for assessing
a given aspect of religion. Other criteria for evaluating religious beliefs and prac-
tices also include logical consistency, the coherence of an overall set of religious
understanding and consistency with scientific, humanistic and philosophical under-
standing and knowledge as well as existential plausibility and giving a reasonable
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answer to fundamental human questions, especially those arousing within an indi-
vidual’s life experience, and within the understanding of the meaning of her individ-
ual life and fate achieved [Meister, p. 38‒41].
However,  it  is  necessary  to  emphasize  three  crucial  differences  between
a philosopher of religion and a believer of a given faith. A philosopher of religion
can study the value of a given religion as a whole and a particular proposition that
comes into play,  and it  will  not  be  a  problem for  her when she concludes that
a given fragment of religion is devoid of cognitive value. It is different in the case
of a devotee.  This is  because beliefs that  fulfill  worldview functions are passed
down as the specific whole and undermining a fragment of a given religion some-
how casts suspicion on the entire religious tradition. Different religions will “react”
differently in such situations, and religions which seem to be more rational will be
able to be modified in the light of philosophical inquiries or the results of scientific
research [Pepliński, 2013, p. 65‒69].
The second difference arises from a fact related to the previous one, namely
when the believer evaluates given religion, also regarding its theoretical dimension,
she considers the whole religion. She does not examine only a particular fragment
of religion, for example, the belief in the factuality of the occurrence of a specific
miracle, such as the transformation of water into wine or the value of view that ev-
erything, every being and good is contingent and related to suffering. Therefore,
even if she encounters some theoretical difficulties related to a particular aspect of
her religion, in her evaluation, she takes into account its total ‘explanatory/interpre-
tative’ power.  The  comparison  of  this  aspect  of  competing  worldviews  requires
much life experience, knowledge of different religions, and time. It is very difficult
to properly assess the rationality of accepting such a given set of religious beliefs at
a given moment. Instead, a more significant role should be attributed to the rational-
ity of actions aimed at changing the state of knowledge and increasing the spiritual
understanding of man in the light of various competing philosophies and religions.
The third difference between an ordinary interpreter of a given religion and
a follower lies in the fact that the acceptance/rejection of a given religious statement
(or its interpretation) does not depend solely on its epistemic function, but also on
the practical tasks that it performs in the religion of a given believer. In other words,
the rationality of her position may be limited due to the interference of non-epis-
temic functions.
If a devotee of a religion wishes to react to the conscious fact of religious dis -
agreement rationally, she should proceed just as it was suggested. She should search
for new argumentation, undermining and strengthening the current one, both for and
against her position. This requires deepening the understanding of one’s own reli-
gious tradition and deepening the understanding of competing ones. One can ratio-
nally stick to one’s views, as long as one is still inquiring about the truth of one’s
own and different positions. It can be complicated, and probably reaching an abso-
lute epistemological certainty and security is not available to us. However, the ratio-
nality of an attitude that accepts a particular religion does not require absolute cer-
tainty,  but  only  occupying  a  critical  attitude  of  open-mindedness,  and  seeking
a new, fuller, better-justified understanding, including understanding different reli-
gious perspectives.
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We should strive to change our uncertain epistemic situation by following the
principle that reasons and evidence should determine what we believe. However, we
should not restrict the set of possible reasons and evidence to only philosophical or
scientific  kind.  There  is  a  place  for  personal  experience  as  well  as  theological
knowledge, too. An issue that requires in-depth discussion is the weight that should
be attributed to the various types of evidence used to solve this kind of discord7.
References
Alston, W. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1993.
Alston, W. Religion, in Borchert, D. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. Thomson Gale,
Macmillan Reference, 2006, vol. 8, pp. 366‒383.
Bocheński J.M. The Logic of Religion. NY: New York University Press, 1965.
Bronk, A.  Podstawy nauk o religii [The Foundations of Sciences of Religion]. Lublin: To-
warzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 2003. (In Polish)
Dormandy, K. Resolving Religious Disagreements: Evidence and Bias, Faith and Philosophy,
2018, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 56‒83.
Gellman, J. Religious Diversity and the Epistemic Justification of Religious Belief, Faith and
Philosophy, 1993, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 345‒364.
Hadot, P. Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, edited
with an Introduction by Arnold I.  Davidson, translated by Michael Chase,  Oxford/Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Basil Blackwell, 1995.
King, N.L. Religious Diversity and Its Challenges to Religious Belief. Philosophy Compass,
2008, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 830‒853.
Kraft, J.  The Epistemology of  Religious Disagreement:  A Better Understanding,  Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012.
Lackey, J. Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously, in Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy
O’Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014):
299‒316.
Meister Ch.V. Introducing Philosophy of Religion, NY: Routledge, 2009.
Pepliński, M. Ani  racjonalizacja  swiatopoglądu,  ani  rezygnacja  z mądrości. Czy  metafilo-
zofia Kazimierza Twardowskiego może być wyznacznikiem rzetelnie uprawianej filozofii klasy-
cznej? [Neither the rationalization of the worldview nor the resignation from wisdom. Can Ka-
zimierz Twardowski’s meta-philosophy be the determinant of reliably practiced classical philoso-
phy?] Filo-Sofija, 2018, vol. 18.40, pp. 41‒78. (In Polish)
Pepliński, M. Wartości epistemiczne wiary w świetle Logiki religii  Józefa Marii  Bocheń-
skiego. Filo-Sofija, 2013, vol. 13, 2, pp. 53‒70. (In Polish)
Pittard, J. Religious Disagreement. Available at: https://www.iep.utm.edu/rel-disa/ (accessed –
17.11.2018)
Plantinga, A. Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Swinburne, R. Faith and Reason. NY: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Waardenburg,  J.  Religionen und Religion.  Systematische  Einfṻhrung in  die  Religionswis-
senschaft. Berlin, 1986.
7 I want to thank anonymous reviewer and Nelly Strehlau for taking the time to read and comment
on an earlier draft of this article. Their comments were very helpful.
